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1. INTRODUCTION
In the pursuit of prots, economic agents, be they large rms or single in-
dividuals, seek to gain an advantage over direct competitors by introducing
new goods, services, and technologies. This leads to continuous adoption
of innovations,which are widely recognized as the key to growthand devel-
opment. Innovating is therefore a socially valuable activity, and a classical
example of the way in which the selsh pursuit of the private interest may
lead toincreased socialwelfare when channeled throughproperly organized
markets. The private advantage, though, is greatly magnied when the in-
novator is the sole supplier of the new good, service, or process; everybody
loves to be a monopolist, and innovators are no exception to this rule. The
felicitous coincidence of private and public interest breaks down here, as
social welfare is generally harmed by the presence of monopolies.
Remaining, or becoming, a monopolist requires special skills and abun-
dant resources. Often, such skills and resources allow one to stay ahead
through relentlessly innovation. Not less often, though, abundant skills and
resources are invested in keeping the competitive advantage by turning the
innovation into a monopoly, either through various forms of legal exclu-
sion, or by making very hard for competitors to imitate and reproduce the
good.
1 We call this activity rent-seeking. At the core of this paper is
the observation that A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a
trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufacturers.
[Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I.vii.26]. The efforts to grab either a
granted monopoly, or a trade secret we call, respectively, public and private
rent-seeking.
A crucial question in current and past debates on innovation is the role
of intellectual property - especially patents - in fostering innovations and
their adoption. Whether intellectual property increases or decreases inno-
vation is uncertain. There are two main arguments in favor of intellectual
property. The rst is that without the benet of a government monopoly,
on account of increasing returns to scale, innovations would either not be
produced at all or too few innovations would be produced. In Boldrin and
Levine [1999, 2002] we showed that even in the absence of legal protec-
tion some, possibly most, innovations would be produced, so that at least
there is a cost benet trade-off between the deadweight loss of monopoly
and the extra innovation that it would produce. However, we also showed
1Sometime the instruments used to maintain exclusivity are rather extreme. The Astro-
nomical Clock on the Old Town Hall of Prague dates back to 1410 and, so the story goes,
the city had its manufacturer, Mikulas of Kadan, blinded once the clock was completed to
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that since innovations require earlier innovations as input, it is far from cer-
tain that government grants of monopoly actually increase innovation- they
may well lead to less innovation. Neither the industrial organization nor
the growth literatures have not provided much in the way of empirical ev-
idence about these effects; the debate remains therefore wide open on the
role that patent protection play in fostering innovations, their adoption and
continuing economic progress.
There is however, a second argument in favor of intellectual property.
This correctly observes that rent-seeking is possible through the private sec-
tor as well as the public, and that legal grants of monopoly may mitigate the
costs of private rent-seeking. This may well be possible. However, what
is certain is that one of the strongest arguments against existing intellec-
tual property law is that it encourages socially wasteful rent-seeking and
regulative capture in the public sector. This phenomenon has been largely
ignored by economists. Here we begin to remedy that gap by examining
the political economy of intellectual property and asking whether allowing
public rent-seeking really leads to a welfare improvement because of the
consequent reduction in private rent-seeking.
That public rent-seeking plays an important role in the acquisition of in-
tellectual property is clear. The recent Sony Bono copyright extension law
is a good case in point: the U.S. Congress unanimously on a voice vote
extended copyright retroactively by 20 years - yet there is no economic ar-
gument whatsoever in favor of retroactive extensionof intellectualproperty.
Surprisingly, a U.S. Supreme Court that has payed strong lip-service to the
principle that the original language of the Constitution matters, upheld this
extension in the Eldred Case, in the face of clear language that Congress
can grant copyright for only a limited time. Other examples of public rent-
seeking abound: in 1984 the pharmaceutical industry was given extended
patent protection, in 1994 the term for all utility patents was extended from
17 to 20 years. In one of the most dramatic examples of judicial legislation,
the courts enormously extended the range of patent protection to include
business practices in 1998. During the Reagan administration, the patent
examination system was reformed to make it possible to patent even the
vaguest of claims. Various legal devices, such as the submarine patent
are used to extend the length of protection, and patenting of the well-known
and obvious has become widely used to greenmail rms into paying li-
censing fees. In the internationalarena, the U.S. has fought long and hard to
force other countries to conform - retroactively - to our patent and copyright
law.
While there are clear social dangers of allowing the government to grant
monopolies, ranging from the ease with which they can be concealed from
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the start, rent-seeking is possible in the private markets too. Hence the view
that patents are a socially valuable substitute for trade-secrecy. Granting a
legal monopoly in exchange for revealing the secret of the innovation is
one, apparently clean, way to make innovations more widely available in
the long run. However, this argument has not been subject to much scrutiny
by economists, and indeed, in the simplest case it fails. Suppose that each
innovationcan be kept secret for some period of time, with the actual length
varying from innovation to innovation, and that the length of legal patent
protection is 20 years. Then the innovator will choose secrecy in those
cases where it is possible to keep the secret for longer than 20 years, and
choose patent protection in those cases where the secret can be kept only for
less than 20 years. In this case, patent protection has a socially damaging
effect. Secrets that can be kept for more than 20 years are still kept for the
maximum length of time, while those that without patent would have been
kept for a shorter time, are now maintained for at least 20 years. Indeed, it
is important to realize that outside the pharmaceutical industry, where the
regulatory system effectively forces revelation in any case, trade secrecy
is considerably more important than patent. Indeed, in a survey of R&D
lab managers for processes, only 23% indicate that patents are effective as
a means of appropriating returns, and for products only 35% indicate that
patents are effective. By way of contrast, 51% argue that trade-secrecy is
effective in both cases.
2
Although in the simplest case, patent law does not impact on trade-
secrecy, in cases where it is possible to expend real resources in making the
secret less accessible, the innovator faces a real trade-off between private
and public rent-seeking. The goal of this paper is to examine that trade-off
and establish when patents may and may not yield an efciency gain. This
efciency gain may have two sources. First, private rent-seeking may imply
a higher social cost than public rent-seeking; in this case social efciency
demands a legal monopoly on account of the large social costs induced by
private individuals pursuing trade and industrial secrecy. Second, the pur-
suit of trade and industrial secrecy may lead the innovator to restrain pro-
duction of the new good even more than a legal monopolist would, thereby
imposing a larger dead-weight loss upon consumers; in this case the con-
cession of a legal monopoly leads the innovator to safely expand capacity
and allow for a more rapid adoption of the good. Our analysis shows that
both these elements are indeed at play in a fairly simple and natural model
of private and public rent-seeking.
Our major new nding is that there may be greater secrecy with intellec-
tual property than without it. The public rent-seeking option has positive
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value only after a certain critical level of productive capacity is accumu-
lated. Hence, an innovator that has purchased the option has an incentive
to keep the secrecy until that level of capacity is reached, which can be
achieved by investing substantially in the private rent-seeking effort. We
show that this complementarity between public and private rent-seeking
may lead to higher expenditure on private rent-seeking when the public
rent-seeking option is available than when it is not. There are many his-
torical examples suggesting that this kind of interplay between the private
and the public channel to rent-seeking may be a relevant source of social in-
efciencies. A particularly startling example
3 comes from the agricultural
sector. Since the beginning of the XIX century, when the production of new
seed and plant varieties took a central place in the development of modern
agriculture, and until the 1960s, many new seeds were introduced but very
few if any were patented and enjoyed legal monopoly protection. The rea-
sonforthiswasrelativelysimple: newseedswere technicallynotpatentable
because seeds coming from natural reproduction could not be distinguished
from those coming from plant breeders (the same did apply, and apparently
still applies, to cattle). This state of affair continued until during the 1940s,
after 50 years of research and thanks to a lot of private and public research
money, the hybridization technique became available. To make a long story
short, this technique allows for the production of patentable seeds, as the
hybrid seeds cannot be reproduced (they are sterile), and only people that
control the original pure kinds of seeds can produce the hybrid through a
monitorable fertilization technique. From then on, lobbying from compa-
nies producing hybrid seeds for new and special legislation for plant patents
intensied, and in 1960 the Plant Varieties Protection Act was enacted. This
is the most stringent patent legislationfor agricultural products in the whole
world; it is this legislation that USA chemical monopolies are trying to im-
pose on the agricultural sectors of less developed economies. Hybrid seeds,
which cost billions of private and public dollars to be developed, are neither
particularly more productive or socially (as opposed to privately) valuable
than traditional ones. They are, instead, patentable, which allows their pro-
ducers to establish and maintain a monopoly power. Notice, in particular,
that if the option of eventually purchasing patents for the hybrid seeds had
not been available, resources would have not been waisted in the rst place
to develop the hybridization technique. This is a good example of socially
damaging reinforcement between private and public rent-seeking.
This interaction is a natural outcome of our model, but goes dramatically
against established wisdom. It shows that the idea of a benecial tradeoff
3Thanks to Julio Barragan Arce, a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota, for
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between the two kinds of rent-seeking activities may well be an illusion,
thereby bringing the theory closer to the facts of life. We prove that such
perverse effect is always at play when the private cost of public rent-seeking
is relatively high; in particular, when the cost of public rent-seeking is so
high that an innovator is indifferent between purchasing or not purchasing
the public monopoly option. One may therefore be led to conclude that
all is needed is a benevolent social planner setting the cost of public rent-
seeking low enough to make this perverse effect vanish. This is correct: all
that is needed is a benevolent social planner, if we had one. The usual per-
spective is one in which the government can perfectly commit to a socially
efcient mechanism. In practice, governments committing to socially ef-
cient mechanisms are less frequent than complete contingent markets. As
we briey reminded above, in reality we observe that, through a process
of regulatory capture, governments eventually become part of the overall
rent-seeking system. We examine the latter perspective in our nal section
where we endogenize the cost of obtaining a patent. Here we are looking
at the polar opposite of the usual case; in the usual case commitment is
complete and institutions function perfectly; when the government is rent-
seeking, institutionsdo not function in the social interest. We show that this
has potentially devastating consequences for innovation and welfare. The
rent-seeking regulator will set the cost of public monopoly near the level
at which the innovator becomes indifferent between exercising or not the
public monopoly option. At this level, as we just argued, the level of ex-
penditure in private rent-seeking activities is maximized. This leaves the
question of the extent to which institutional commitment is possible. We
think that a complete absence of patent rights can be institutionally com-
mitted. It is, for example, easily veriable, which increases the chances
of sticking to the commitment. We suspect that anything less is likely to
be subverted, as witness the many examples of rent-seeking extensions of
intellectual property law cited above.
Related Literature. Little has been written about the trade-off between se-
crecy and public rent-seeking beyond the bland and incorrect assertion that
patents lead to revelation of secrets that would not otherwise be revealed.
There is a small literature that focuses on the information revelation process
that occurs during patenting (Anton and Yao [2000]) and on their role in
patent races (Battacharya and Ritter [1983)], Horstmann, MacDonald and
Slivinski [1985]). Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [1990] examine how disclosing
information that changes beliefs may work to a rm's advantage. Ponce
[2003] considers the possibility that by disclosing a secret, a rival might
be prevented from patenting the idea. This leads to the possibility that se-
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that this literature usually focuses on oligopoly, assumes there are no costs
in public rent-seeking and does not consider the issue of timing. The politi-
cal economy of intellectual property law has been even less well examined.
Scotchmer [ 2001] examines the political economy of patent treaties - an
important topic, but not one directly related to the issue of public versus
private rent-seeking.
From a broader perspective we are also interested in the utilization of
patents over the life-cycle of industry. Our intuition based on industry case
studies is that they play a relatively unimportant role in the early life the
industry when demand is still quite elastic and the number of entrepreneurs
is very large. It is in the mature stage where demand is inelastic, few rms
are either around or entering, and returns on innovative efforts are low, that
the competition for innovation ceases and the competition for government
grants of monopoly begins. The computer software industry seems like a
case in point, with legal action taking center stage only as the industry ma-
tured, and Microsoft gained substantial monopoly power, while the innova-
tion rate stagnated or even declined in spite of the stronger legal protection
awarded to IP.
4 As a rst step, we focus here on the optimal timing of pro-
tection for a single innovator, establishing that it is later rather than earlier
in the product life-cycle that patent protection is worth paying for. In other
words, here we concentrate only on the impact of demand elasticity on pub-
lic rent seeking. In particular, we do not consider the fact, especially impor-
tant in early stages of an industry, that innovations build on each other. As
many authors have pointed out, see Scotchmer [1991], Boldrin and Levine
[1997, 1999], and Bessen and Maskin [2000], for example, patents are es-
pecially costly in this context.
In understanding this paper, it is useful to begin by asking what posi-
tive role can patents and other forms of intellectual property (IP) have. On
the one hand, when the sole innovator has no access to the secrecy-keeping
technology, then either imitation or market acquisition of the new technol-
ogy leads to expansion of productive capacity, competition, and efciency.
Ontheotherhand, whenmanyindividualsinnovatesimultaneouslythemin-
imum size restriction typical of innovation must not be binding, in which
case, again, an environmentwithoutmonopolyrightsmaximizessocialwel-
fare. The presence or absence of a secrecy enhancing technology is irrele-
vantinsuchcircumstances, asnobodyhas anyincentivetouseit. Thismuch
we have shown in Boldrin and Levine [1997, 1999, 2002], where some of
the social costs of allowing for patents, copyrights, and other forms of IP in
the environments just illustrated are documented. A corollary of our argu-
ment is that reverse engineering, if it takes place in competitive markets, is
4As documented, among other, by Bessen and Maskin [2000]RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 7
socially benecial even when it involves a set-up cost. This follows from
the observation that reverse engineering is just another means of expanding
productive capacity for the new good. Under perfect competition, if it is
protable to use it to expand capacity, then it is also socially useful. This
observation rids of one of the most frequently abused arguments supporting
IP, and patents in particular: that patents, by forcing the disclosure of the in-
novative secret, avoid the socially wasteful rediscovery of the same idea
by future imitators. This argument relies either on the existence of some
negative external effect, whose nature is obscure to us, or on the assump-
tion that pure or disembodied ideas have economic and productive value,
which is patently false.
If patents, though, are necessary neither to induce innovation(when com-
petitive rents provide plenty of incentives), nor to avoid wasteful rediscov-
ery (when reverse engineering is socially valuable) then: what are patents
good for? The answer must be found in a situationwhere there is not a great
deal of simultaneous innovation, the ideas that are patented cannot lead to
further valuable innovation, and private secrecy is effectively enforceable.
In this case IP may serve two purposes. First, it may serve to increase the
incentive to innovate in the presence of xed costs. This idea has been
extensively examined, and we will not re-examine it here. Second it may
help avoid wasteful expenses in private secrecy, which we call here private
rent-seeking. Consider, for instance, the case in which private investment
in secrecy is effective because it reduces the risk of being imitated, but has
substantial social cost. In this case it is possible that public rent-seeking
in the form of publicly enforced IP may be a cost effective replacement for
private secrecy. This tradeoff between the social costs of private and public
rent-seeking is at the heart of this paper.
2. THE MODEL
As indicated, our focus is not on the role of intellectual property in pro-
motinginnovation,but rather on the impact that the substitutabilitybetween
private and public rent-seeking may have on the rate of adoption of inno-
vations, and on the IP policies that optimize social welfare. For this reason
we shall examine the case of a single innovator, who has already produced
an innovation and, at a private cost, can reduce the chances that other may
imitate his product. We make the twin assumptions that the innovator starts
out as a natural monopolist, and has access to a private technology to en-
hance secrecy, because, as we have argued, these are the circumstances in
which a publicly enforced system of IP may serve a benecial purpose.
Three observations about innovation are captured in our model. First, it
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the absence of legal protection it is possible for the innovator to achieve a
degree of monopoly through secrecy; such degree of secrecy varies from
innovation to innovation. Third, ideas are useful only insofar as they are
embodied in either people or things, hence the leaking of industrial secrets
about innovation has an impact only insofar it is embodied in new produc-
tive capacity.
Our perspective is one in which making copies of the new good requires
productive capacity. We model productive capacity by merging two ingre-
dients, capital (either physical or human, as we will see momentarily) and
the secret, or idea. It is useful to think of two polar cases. In the rst case,
the entire idea behind the new product is embodied in a particular type of
machine. By building the machines himself and exercising physical control
over them, the innovator can attempt to retain his monopoly power over the
new idea.
5 In this case, productive capacity is equal to the number of ex-
isting machines, which grows only if the owner of machines allows them
to grow. Further, whatever is valuable in the innovation is embodied in the
machines. Eventually, due to some random event, the secret may escape
the innovator's control. In this case monopoly power is not lost as all pro-
ductive capacity is still in the hands of the initial innovator. Because of
this, he is still a monopolist, at most facing a competitive fringe. This we
call the Coca-Cola case. At the opposite extreme, almost everything that
is valuable in the idea is embodied in the human capital of each worker
hired and trained by the innovator. The innovator, nevertheless, does re-
tain the last piece of the puzzle, which is necessary to turn workers into
productive capacity. When this last piece is revealed, again due to a ran-
dom event, any and all workers may independently start production of the
nal good. Hence, in this second case productive capacity is the number
of trained workers. The latter is controlled by the innovator until a ran-
dom event reveals the secret to the workers. After the random event, the
innovator must compete with his own workers. This we call the Napster
case, because, after the secret is revealed, it is functionally equivalent to the
model studied in Boldrin and Levine [1999]. We describe that model here
briey, to provide an additional interpretation of the formalism adopted and
facilitate later references to results. In that model the valuable idea is com-
pletely contained in the nal good (a CD) which is durable. Anyone who
5Or at least until the innovationis independentlydiscovered. As mentioned,we will not
examine the possibility of independent inventions in this paper; while patents can be and
are used to hinder independent discovery, the economic rationale supporting this is quite
weak. As we have argued, in the absence of patents, simultaneous discovery can be an
efcient event which increases productive capacity and social welfare. Scotchmer [1991]
also makes the case that IP protection should not be strong in the face of independent
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has purchased the CD can easily see how it is made, and produce their own
copies. Productive capacity corresponds to the cumulated number of copies
of the CD, as the remaining inputs needed to copy are available to anyone
at competitive prices. In this case secrecy is impossible (as the aforemen-
tionedlast piece of the puzzle isabsent) and, barring legalrestrictions, the
innovator is in direct competition with his customers as soon as he makes
a sale. Hence, capacity grows over time as additional copies are made and
sold, and competition reigns from the outset.
Our model will allow these two extremes, as well as intermediate cases.
Specically, if the last piece of the puzzle becomes known when produc-
tive capacity is k we assume that a fraction of capacity a remains in the
hands of the original innovator, with the remaining fraction 1 a falling
into the hands of competitors. In the Napster case, a = 0 while in the Coca-
Cola case a = 1. Note that we assume that the last piece of the puzzle
followsthe traditional model of diffusionof ideas - once revealed, it spreads
instantaneouslyand costlessly. It isa strikingfact thateven if a large portion
of the idea is immune from the costs ordinarily associated with information
transmission, the fact that a remaining portion of the idea is subject to the
ordinary constraints of scarcity is enough to enable the originator of the
idea to obtain the full competitive rent in the form of the present value of
all downstream prots generated by the original idea.
2.1. Production and Consumption. Producing consumption requires two
ingredients,capital, and the secret needed for turningcapital intoproductive
capacity. As noted, inthe Coca-Cola case thesecret iscompletelyembodied
in the machines. Once you get your hands on one machine you control
its secret; as machines reproduce themselves, owners of machines control
productive capacity and its growth rate. In the Napster case the secret is
embodied in workers, minus the little detail controlled by the innovator. As
long as workers work for the innovator, they constitute productive capacity.
When working independently, they are completely unproductive until the
secret is revealed. In both cases we denote productive capacity by k. Initial
capacity, held by the sole innovator, is k0. To simplify computations we
adopt a continuous time model, and assume the real interest rate r is xed.
We adopt the simplest formalism for increasing capacity over time: as in
Quah's [2002] 24/7 model, or in a learning by doing model, capacity grows
at  k  gk, with equality unless the owner of k exercises his power to freely
dispose of capacity.6
6In what follows we assume this growth rate to be independent of how many people
are privy to the secret. The maximum growth rate of capacity is likely to increase when
the secret is revealed. In this case some of our results are strengthened, as we note when
relevant.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 10
Productive capacity produces consumption. The ow of consumption is
c(t)  k(t), with equality holding unless the owner of the stock of capacity
elects to withdraw some from production. There is a single representative





where m is the numeraire good. In addition to productive capacity, con-
sumption may need other resources to produce. We assume that this indus-
try is small, so that the other resources are obtained at the xed price w.
Hence, the instantaneous cost of producing c units of consumption is wc.
Concerning utility and cost, we assume
Assumption 2.1. u(c) is thrice continuously differentiable, and u0(0) > w.
We can then dene instantaneous prots p(c)=maxf0;u0(c)c wcg. We
assume that these are well-behaved in the following sense
Assumption 2.2. p(c) is single peaked, with a maximum at c = M.
For future reference, letC >0 denote the value of outputat which p(C)=
0
2.2. Monopoly and Competition. We assume that the innovator's objec-
tive is the average present value of prots. Consider rst the case in which
the innovator has a complete monopoly, that is: he controls all productive
capacity from beginning to end. This corresponds to the case of a = 1. The
average present valueof prots is r
￿
¥
0 e rtp(c(t))dt. Facing a capacity con-
straint that grows at a constant rate, and a single-peaked prot function, the
optimal plan for the monopolist is clear enough: allow capacity to grow as
rapidly as possible until the prot maximum is reached at k = M, then stop
investing, and leave capacity xed at M. Let s = (1=g)log(M=k0) denote
the time at which k(s) = k0egs = M. Note, for future use, that the time to
the prot maximum s is a function of the initial condition k0, even if we





for the average present value of prots accruing to this plan beginning with
an initial capital stock of k. It is straightforward to see that, in light of
our assumption about p, the function R1(k) is maximized when the initial
condition satises k = M.
Consider next the case in which there is complete competition. Here the
innovator controls a negligible share of total productive capacity, that is:
a = 0, and he is in direct competition with the imitators. Since, even in
this case, every available piece of productive capacity must derive from theRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 11
original unit held by the innovator, and since imitators compete with each
other bidding their own prots to zero, as in Boldrin and Levine [1999], the
innovator still earns the competitiverent, which is the average present value
of prots. However, contrary to the previous case, the growth of productive
capacity is out of the control of the innovator; competition between many
producers leads capacity to expand at the greatest possible rate, and output
to expand to the point at which prots fall to zero. So the competitive rent,





Recall that we have dened prots to be zero when capacity is such that
marginalcostwouldexceed price, that is, when productivecapacityis larger
than C. We show in Lemma A.2 of Appendix A that R0(k) is maximized
at a stock of capital M0 < M. The subscripts zero and one in R0(k);R1(k)
are meant to remind that a = 0;a = 1, respectively, hold here; later on we
will introduce the function, Ra(k), for the general case of 0  a  1. This
has a maximizer M0  Ma  M1 = M, which by Lemma A.2 is shown to be
strictly increasing in a 2 [0;1].
It is interesting to examine the difference between monopoly prots and
competitive rents, R1(k) R0(k). Recall that e rs = (k0=M)r=g, and that in
bothcases, capacity, andhence prots,growsasquicklyaspossibleuntilthe
prot maximum is reached at M. Hence the difference between monopoly
prots and competitive rents is simply their difference at M discounted by
the time it takes to reach M.
R1(k) R0(k) = (k=M)r=g(p(M) R0(M)):
This is an increasing function of k: the higher initial productive capacity is,
the stronger the incentive to retain monopoly power. The key observation
from comparing monopoly and competition is that both competitive rents
and monopoly prots constitute the present value of a future prot stream:
the benet of monopoly is that it makes it possible to keep capacity from
expanding beyond M, thereby keeping prots at their maximum forever.
Two additional remarks. Neither the value of R1(k) nor that of R0(k)
depend on the probability of loosing the secret, because in the rst case the
secret is, from a practical point of view, never lost, while in the second it is
lost immediately. Suppose the stock of capital at the time the secret is lost
is k. By analogy, then, we will also dene Ra(k) for values of a 2 (0;1)
as a function of the stock k when the secret is lost. This will facilitate
comparison and computations in the subsequent analysis.
2.3. Rent-Seeking. Our goal is to consider the implications of allowing
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secret leaking out, which, in conjunction with the reproducibility of the
stock of capital, would force him to face competition in subsequent peri-
ods. This possibility induces rent-seeking by the innovator, who would like
to behave like a monopolist by controlling capacity. He can do so privately,
by keeping key ideas surrounding the innovation secret and by designing
the product to make reverse engineering difcult. However, once the secret
leaks out, it cannot be made unsecret. Thus, our model of private rent-
seeking is one in which the innovator chooses an effort level of a to keep
the secret. We let a be the up-front cost; there may also be an ongoing cost,
including the possibility that making the product less easy to reverse engi-
neer makes it less useful to consumers. An example would be crops that are
genetically engineered to be sterile, thereby preventing farmers from repro-
ducing them. As long as the innovator must commit at the initial time to
a particular level of ongoing cost, we may capitalize the expected present
value of this cost into the initial up-front cost a, so the only loss in gen-
erality is that we do not consider the possibility that the ongoing cost may
be endogenously chosen to be time-dependent. Given the effort level mea-
sured by a, there is a chance that the secret is lost. This occurs according
to a Poisson process with intensity parameter l(a).7 Naturally, l is de-
creasing in a; assume this occurs at a decreasing rate. It is natural to think
of the secret being lost through reverse engineering (either on the product
in the Coca-Cola case, or by workers in the Napster case) and the success
of the reverse engineering to depend on the effort made to acquire the se-
cret. We do not explicitly model the reverse engineering effort, treating it
as exogenous. Notice, however, that the cost of reverse engineering will be
accounted for in the price paid to acquire the product. Keeping secrecy by
means of this kind of a effort, we call private rent-seeking.
We wish also to consider the possibility of public rent-seeking, that is
rent-seekingthroughthelegalsystem. Thisrent-seekingtakesplacethrough
the purchase of a legal monopoly. Since existing patent terms are quite long
(20 years) we assume the monopoly lasts forever, and do not consider the
question of optimal patent term. Other forms of IP, such as non-disclosure
agreements may last forever anyway. To completely acquire a legal monop-
oly, in reality, requires potentiallyseveralcosts. Initially,the innovatormust
pay a cost b0. This may correspond to the need to le for patent protection
as soon as possible and to the fact that non-disclosure agreements must be
signed prior to revealing the good; or to other elements that might either
7Little of substance would changeif it were made to depend also upon currentor cumu-
lated output. It would only increase the incentive to reduce capacity and output to maintain
secrecy. This we can pretend to be captured by the social cost of private rent-seeking, wa,
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practically or legally require an initial payment. Second, at some time at
or before the secret is revealed and the monopoly purchased, an additional
cost b1 might be incurred. For example, it may be possible to anticipate
the revelation of the secret, and take out a patent immediately before it is
revealed, or purchase a submarine patent, surfacing only when the secret
leaks out. In addition a third cost may be incurred every time the legal mo-
nopoly is enforced. This cost, which is not modeled here, might include,
for example, the legal cost of bringing violators to court, which takes place
obviously after the secret is revealed.
Monopoly power allows the innovator to control capacity. Initially, the
innovator has a defacto monopoly, and chooses how much a to expend, and
whether or not to expend b0. This xes l the instantaneous probability of
the secret leaking out. In any case, the innovator enjoys a monopoly until
the Poisson event of the secret being lost occurs. Up until this time, the
innovator is assumed to have complete control over capacity through his
unique knowledge of the secret. If he choses the initial expenditure of b0
he also has the option during this period of paying b1 and getting a legal
monopoly - but since the interest rate is positive, it is better to wait. When
the Poisson event occurs, if he has not done it before, and if he has made
the initial expenditure b0, the innovator must decide whether to expend b1
to secure legal monopoly or not.
What happens when the secret is lost? This is potentially quite compli-
cated. The secret, like capital, may take some time to spread. In fact, the
slow speed at which ideas spread is probably one of the key empirical fac-
tors making patents and IP redundant or socially damaging in many cases.
Still, given the scope of this paper, we shall simplify the analysis and stack
the odds in favor of IP by considering the extreme case in which the se-
cret spreads instantaneously once it is uncovered. Still, to take advantage
of the secret requires competitors to have a stock of capital of their own. In
the Napster case, the stock of capital is not controlled by the innovator, but
rather by his workers or customers, who, once the secret is available, turn
capital into productive capacity and become competitors. More precisely,
under the interpretation of capital as the human capital of the workers, once
the secret is revealed the workers set up a large number of independent and
competitive rms producing the good. However, in the Coca-Cola case the
productive capacity takes the form of specialized physical capital that be-
longs to the innovator. In this case, even if the Poisson event occurs and
the secret is made public, new machines owned by the competitors will take
time to build, while the innovator still retains all or at least a large fraction
of his machines. This issue is both relevant and delicate, so we discuss it
next in some detail.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 14
To be concrete we shall assume that, after the secret is revealed only a
fraction 0  a  1 of the capital remains with the innovator. The remainder
portion of capacity 1 a is transferred to the competitors, through means
we will discuss momentarily. Due to competition, this capacity grows as
quickly as feasible, that is at the rate g. The remaining level of investment
is controlled by the innovator, who, like a monopolist faced with a compet-
itive fringe, may choose how quickly to grow his own capacity, up to the
maximum growth rate of g. Notice that faced with a competitive fringe, the
innovator will wish to move towards his best response to the ow of output
produced by the fringe rms. This will increase his own prot, but will not
increase industry prots and may in fact reduce them. This would be the
optimal response of the innovator after the secret is leaked, if it were not the
case that, in fact, he has a vested interest in maximizing the prot level for
the whole industry. The reason is simple: to the extent the innovator knows
thatthere isa chance the secret willleak, he can act in such a way to sellpart
of his capacity to competitors before the event leaks. This can be done in a
variety of ways, for example, by selling the goods themselves (the Napster
case of Boldrin and Levine [1999]), by training workers at an implicit fee
deducted from their wages (the Napster case when capital is human capital),
via prot sharing agreements, by sale of parts of the equipment not carrying
the secret, or by a variety of contingent contracts. The key point is that the
price at which the innovator can sell his capacity depends on industry prof-
its after the secret leaks out. In other words, before the secret leaks out, the
innovator has an incentive to commit to maximizing industry prots after
the secret leaks, because this choice maximizes the prices at which he can
sell capacity. This commitment problem, however, is easily solved. The
innovator would like to commit to keeping industry output high, and not
lowering towards his best-response. The commitment can be as simple as
selling advance orders. These advance orders can be contingent on when
the secret is revealed, and whether he chooses to use the option of a public
monopoly, but we will see later that the optimal plan in these contingencies
is consistent with honoring the advance orders anyway, so he needs not do
so. Our assumption, then, is that through precommitment, if the innovator
chooses not to use the option of public monopoly, he chooses his output
after the secret leaks out to maximize industry prot.
2.4. An Example. It is useful to have a concrete example of how this
model works. We adopt the following example from an episode of the tele-
vision series The Simpsons. Let us imagine a good that is an alcoholic
beverage called a aming Moe made from Tequila, Schnapps, Crème deRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 15
Menthe, and the secret ingredient: Krusty Non-Narkotik Kough Syrup.8
To produce this beverage requires careful combination of the ingredients.
The stock of productive capital is represented by skilled bartenders who are
trained to carry out this elaborate process. However, only Moe, the inno-
vator, knows that the missing piece of the puzzle is Krusty Non-Narkotik
KoughSyrup, the bartenders do not know what it is and Moe adds the secret
ingredient at the end. Each bartender requires an assistant, and after some
period of time, the assistant becomes trained. Initially Moe hires an assis-
tant, and the two of them produce some small amount of the compound.
Once the assistant is trained, they acquire two assistants, one for each, and
productive capacity expands in a series of franchises. At some point, the se-
cret leaks out - and word quickly spreads that the secret ingredient is Krusty
Non-Narkotik Kough Syrup. At this point, the bartenders no longer need to
work for Moe, and all start production on their own; in this case a = 0.
While it might seem that all is lost to Moe at this point, in fact this is not
true. In addition to the prot he earned prior to the revelation of the secret,
he could still have laid claim to the entire expected average present value of
prots his workers will make on their own once the secret is revealed. This
is because he can charge the employees for the knowledge that will, once
the secret is revealed, become useful to them. Competition among potential
employees will reduce their prots to zero. Notice that this second source
of revenues for the innovator must be computed as an expected value: when
he hires the rst assistant the latter faces an expected arrival time of the
Poisson event, which will make her an independent producer. The innova-
tor will charge her for the expected value of the prots she will make after
she opens up shop. Such expected value, clearly, depends on the expected
arrival date of the Poisson event. As Becker [1971] says Firms introducing
innovations are alleged to be forced to share their knowledge with competi-
tors through the bidding away of employees who are privy to their secrets.
This may well be a common practice, but if employees benet from access
to salable information about secrets, they would be willing to work more
cheaply than otherwise. Notice, though, that since the innovator has the
option of purchasing a legal monopoly, employees will insist on a contract
in which they are reimbursed by the innovator if he chooses to purchase
the monopoly. Monopolistic rms do tend to be particularly generous with
their employees.
In our model then, even if both private and public rent-seeking opportu-
nities were absent, the innovator is still holding claim to the entire stream
of prots. Assume, in fact, that the probability of the secret leaking out
is exogenous and that, once the secret is revealed, the whole industry goes
8We are grateful to Sami Dahklia for bringing this example to our attention.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 16
competitive instantaneously. Still, when introducing the new good our hero
looks forward to earning monopoly prots until the secret is revealed, plus
the whole competitive rents earned by the industry from this time onward.
To the extent he retains a fraction a > 0 of total productive capacity after
the secret leaks, he can do better than that. He can commit to the following
strategy: once the secret leaks and a portion (1 a) of the industry goes
competitive, thereby growing at a rate g, the innovator can let the total pro-
ductive capacity grow until the industry's prot maximum of M is reached,
then maintain it at M for a nite amount of time, by letting his own share a
of productive capacity shrink to zero. We call these two periods of time s
and s0, respectively; we have already computed s, s0 is computed in Lemma
A.1 of the Appendix. The monopoly prots accruing to the industry during
the time period s0 will go to the innovator himself, as the competitors bids
their own rents to zero when purchasing their initial stock of capital from
him.
2.5. Costs of Rent-Seeking. In practice there are many ways of maintain-
ing a monopoly. Technical means revolve around secrecy, but secrecy may
also be enforced legally through employment contracts, disclosure agree-
ments, no-compete clauses and other forms of downstreamlicensing. Alter-
natively, a patent provides a legal entitlement to a monopoly. Our distinc-
tion between private (a) and public rent-seeking (b = (b0;b1)) is roughly
that between technical means that do not require government enforcement
(besides preventing theft) and government enforcement itself. The former
can range from developing a product that is difcult to reverse engineer,
employing safes and private security guards, and introducing compensation
schemes that give key employees an incentive to keep the secret by giving
them a share of the monopoly prot. Anton and Yao [1994] give an ex-
ample of such a scheme. On the other hand, government enforced monop-
oly, whether through outright grants as is the case with patents, or through
the enforcement of downstream licensing provisions to prevent employees
from competing to increase capacity beyond the monopoly level, we view
as public rent-seeking.
Both the secrecy cost a and purchase prices b of a legal monopoly repre-
sent the private cost of rent-seeking. Each has also a social cost wa;wb. The
social cost may be either greater or less than the private cost, as the effort to
seek monopoly power may either lead to a waste of other social resources,
or may generate some socially valuable goods. In either case, a portion of
theprivatecost mayrepresent a transfer payment - inthe case of secrecy, the
cost of an incentive scheme to encourage key employees to keep the secret;
in the case of legal protection, the cost of a bribe to a public ofcial. An-
other portion of the private cost may represent an allocative inefciency, forRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 17
example costly engineering time spent to develop a product that is difcult
to reverse engineer, or costly time spent by lobbyists or lawyers lobbying or
litigating. In the case of secrecy, the social cost could conceivably be even
negative, if a product that is difcult to reverse engineer also happens to be
more useful to consumers. In the case of legal protection, the social cost in-
cludes the cost of enforcement, and this can easily exceed the private cost if
the public sector provides costly enforcement services for free. This is what
is envisaged, for example by the SSSCA9, and is currently a consequence
in the U.S. of having a special court system for hearing patent cases. An-
other source of social cost that is not reected in the price of a patent is the
wasteful production of competing or preemptive patents, often aimed only
at delaying or blocking a specic patent, or the distortionary incentive to
produce goods that are patentable as opposed to non patentable, even if the
former may have substantially less social value than the latter. Finally, even
if obvious, we must not forget the dead-weight loss in the ow of consumer
















We are assuming that only the entrepreneur can purchase a legal monop-
oly. There are various reasons for this. In the model, purchasing the full
legal monopoly requires having paid the entry fee b0, a choice available
only to the innovator. Even in the absence of such an entry-fee, as long as
he has a slight cost advantage over his employees and others who have the
secret, the innovators will have an advantage in bidding for the monopoly.
Also, under existing law, the innovator has a legal advantage in getting a
patent. We will consider in more detail below the consequences when a
legal monopoly may be awarded to someone other than the innovator. No-
tice, nally, that in the case of simultaneous innovation, which we do not
consider in this paper, innovators will be willing to expend all expected
monopoly prots in the effort to grab the right to legal monopoly.
Our concern is to study the impact that the legal and institutional envi-
ronment for intellectual property has on private rent-seeking activities, and
the speed of innovations' diffusion. Within our framework, this means tak-
ing b and a as policy or environmental parameters, and characterizing how
9The SSSCA is one of several proposed bills that would mandate computer hardware
in order to protect digital copyrighted material. Since the computer industry is at least an
order of magnitude larger than the value of digital copyrighted material, and the cost of
the mandate is to be borne entirely by that industry, the potential for social cost greatly
exceeding the value of the monopoly being protected is obvious.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 18
the equilibrium choice of a depends upon them. In the last section we also
consider a number of ways in which the public rent-seeking parameters b
can be endogenously determined and the dramatic impact this endogenous
determination may have on social welfare .
3. SOLVING THE MODEL
We nd the optimal strategy for the innovator based on the two options
available at time t = 0, pay or do not pay b0. We call the rst IP and the
second NIP strategy. After characterizing the optimal strategy, we devote
the remainder of the section to explaining the main result. Formal proofs
can be found in Appendix A. We will later examine the solution from the
perspective of mechanism design and social welfare, and nally consider
rent-seeking by the public sector.
3.1. Optimal Strategies for an Innovator. Finding the optimal strategy
involves several steps. First we must nd the optimal innovator strategy
after the secret is revealed. Next, we describe, for given a, the optimal
plans for choosing capacity when, respectively, public rent seeking is not
and is used. Then we solve for the optimal a when b0 is paid, aip, and when
it is not, anip, and for the decision whether or not to use the second stage
of the b option. Finally, we discuss the way in which private rent-seeking
expenditure a depends on the cost b of public rent-seeking.
3.2. What to do After the Secret is Revealed. When the Poisson event
occurs and the secret is revealed, an innovator who did not purchase the
b option at time zero faces a straightforward optimal sequence of action.
He and his competitors increase capacity as quickly as possible until the
industry reaches M. The innovator then acts to maximize industry prots.
To achieve this, he must keep the industry productive capacity at M for as
long as possible. As his competitors continue accumulating their capital
stock at the rate g he must reduce his own capacity until the latter vanishes.
Once he has exhausted his capacity, the industry becomes competitive, and
he earns R0(M) thereafter. (Recall that R0(k) is the competitive rent from
beginning at k.) In the Lemma A.1 we show that the net present value of
being at k when the Poisson event strikes, holding a share a of capacity, and










We show in Lemma A.2 that as g ! ¥ we have Ra(k) ! R0(k).
When the Poisson event occurs, an innovator who has initially chosen to
pay b0 has the option to spend b1. If he chooses not to do so, he is left withRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 19
the same continuation strategy described above. If, instead, he chooses to
pay b1 at the time the secret is revealed, he will grow capacity as quickly as
possible until M is reached, and then remain there forever. Recall that, after
the secret is revealed, an innovatorwho has turned downthe IP option, faces
a payoff equal to Ra(k). The gain over Ra(k) from the plan that involves
paying b1 is simply
µ(k) =

R1(k) Ra(k) b1 k < M
p(M) Ra(M) b1 k  M :
Notice that, depending on k, the function µ(k) can be either positive or
negative. This means that, for a given vector b, the choice of exploiting or
not the public rent-seeking option when the secret is revealed depends upon
the stock of capital at that time.
The two sequences of actions described so far constitute the set of poten-
tially optimal strategies once the secret is revealed.
3.3. Two Strategies Before the Secret is Revealed, NIP and IP. Begin
by noticing that, without costs of rent-seeking, the best strategy consists
in reaching M as soon as possible, and remain there forever. Departing
from such a simple accumulation strategy is optimal only when keeping the
monopoly power forever becomes too costly. This leads, before monopoly
is lost, to choosing a target position for capacity that is lower than M. This
choice serves the purpose of balancing the maximization of period-prots
accruing during the monopolistic phase (which would be achieved at M)
with that of maximizing prots accruing after competition ensues (which,
as shown by Lemma A.2 of the Appendix, is achieved at Ma < M). Denote
this interim target by xa. We show in Lemma A.5 that Ma < xa < M.
Fix a and the initial stock of capital k0. We now dene the two strategies
NIP and IP, and compute the corresponding prots, gross of a, for each of
them.
StrategyNIP. Do not payb0. If k0 >x reduce capacity tox; if k0 <x grow
capacity to x. If x is reached before the Poisson event, stay there until the
event occurs. Once the event occurs, follow the continuation path yielding
Ra. Prots (gross of a) from the NIP strategy are shown in Lemma A.3 of
the Appendix to be
PNIP(a;x) = Ra(k0)+(k0=x)(l(a)+r)=g r
l(a)+r
(p(x) Ra(x)):
Notice that we nd xa by maximizing these prots with respect to x.
Strategy IP. Pay b0. If k0 > M reduce capacity to M; if k0 < M grow
capacity to M. If M is reached before the Poisson event, stay there; when
theeventoccurspayb1. If theeventoccursbefore M isreached andµ(k)<0RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 20
do not pay b1, go instead for payoff Ra. If µ(k)  0 when the event occurs,
expend b1 and allow capacity to grow until M; then remain at M forever.
Prots (gross of a+b0) from the IP strategy are given by







The next theorem describes the optimal strategy.






pay b0, choose a to maximize PIP(a) a and follow strategy IP; otherwise
do not pay b0, choose a;x to maximize PNIP(a;x) a and follow strategy
NIP.
We already mentioned that the level of capital at which accumulation
stops (until the Poisson event hits) in the NIP case satises Ma < xa < M.
This is a source of inefciency, relative to the IP strategy.10 The rst order












then when g ! ¥, xa ! M. Before comparing expenditure in private rent-
seeking under the NIP (anip) and the IP (aip) strategy, we characterize better
the conditions under which the IP strategy is optimal.
3.4. Opting for Public Rent-Seeking. When b0 = 0, the IP strategy is
always adopted. Alternatively, b0 can always be set high enough to make
the NIP strategy more advantageous. Start then with the case in which IP is
optimal in expected value, and b0 has been paid at t = 0. What can be said
about spending b1?
If the Poisson event takes place when the stock of capital is already at M,
the innovator pays b1 if p(M)  Ra(M)+b1. Because p(M) Ra(M) =
(1 a)r=g[p(M) R0(M)], it follows that, in this case, the legal monopoly
is enforced whenever
b1  (1 a)r=g[p(M) R0(M)]:
Consider next the case in which the stock of capital k < M at the time the
Poisson event occurs. Enforcing the legal monopoly requires paying b1,
10When l is an increasing function of capacity or cumulated output, this inefciency is
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accumulating capacity until M is reached s = (1=g)log(M=k) periods later,
and remaining there forever. The gain from doing this is R1(k) Ra(k),
which is increasing in k, and has a maximum at k = M. Assume that







This holds for all





The IP strategy can therefore be characterized in terms of a threshold stock
at the time the Poisson event takes place: if k  k pay b1, otherwise do
not. It would be nice if a similar threshold existed for the initial decision to
purchase the public rent-seeking option at a price b0; in other words if the
initial choice between the IP and the NIP strategy could be reduced to hav-
ing a stock k0 larger or smaller than a certain threshold k0. Unfortunately,
this is not the case as the specic functional form for l(a) and all other
parameters of the model play a role in this decision. To see this, notice that
the expected gain from paying b0 is equal to
PIP(aip) PNIP(anip;xa)+(anip aip):













But this procedure is not as illuminating as in the previous case. This is
because aip is different from anip and, as we show next, the two cannot be
unambiguously ranked.
4. EVALUATING PRIVATE RENT-SEEKING
We move next to the issue that, from a social welfare point of view, is at
the core of our model; which one of the two strategies, the IP or the NIP,
leads to a smaller expenditure in private secrecy? As long as the private,
a, and the social, wa, costs of private rent-seeking are positively correlated,
minimizing the former should minimize the latter. Appendix B reports rstRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 22
and second order conditions for the choice of aip and anip; we show there
that, in general, the optimal choice of either cannot be characterized by
rst order conditions only, as the relevant functions are not concave with
respect to a. We must, therefore, resort to more indirect methods to extract
additional information about the relative magnitudes of aip and anip.
We can try estimating a bound on the equilibrium choice of anip by look-
ing at the private gains from keeping secrecy. The expected private gain is
the difference between the (maximized) value of PNIP and what the innova-
tor would receive at time zero without any secrecy, which is Ra(k0). Recall







When l = ¥ benet is at a minimum, zero in fact (recall that k0  xa).
When l = 0 or g = ¥, benet is at a maximum. In fact, for l = 0 or g = ¥
the optimal choice for xa is M. Let us concentrate on l as the latter can
be affected by proper choice of a. The maximum benet from secrecy is
(k0=M)r=g(p(M) Ra(M)), which is an upper bound on a. Notice that this
isincreasingink0, soexpenditureinprivaterent-seekingshouldbe expected
to be larger when the initial productive capacity is relatively high. Let  a =
(k0=M)r=g(p(M) Ra(M)), and i = l( a). Then, the optimal choice of a








A similar argument applies to aip. The maximum gain from secrecy in this








where DO denotes the variation in the option value O attributable to a de-
crease in l. Notice that, in general, the two bounds are not rankable; never-
theless, at least for values of g that are high in relation to i+r, one would
expect the upper bound for aip to be larger than that for anip, even when DO
is zero.
As discussed in the introduction, one major rationale for allowing public
rent-seeking is that the latter may lead to substantial lower levels of private
rent-seeking, thereby sparing society that source of inefciency. This ar-
gument would be a rather convincing one in favor of the establishment of
legal monopolies if one could show that, in general, the level of expenditure
in private rent-seeking that obtains when the IP strategy is optimal, aip, is
much lower than the one chosen when the NIP strategy is followed, anip.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 23
Unfortunately it is not obvious that, in the general case, aip < anip. We have
already seen, in fact, that the maximumgainsfrom private rent-seeking may
well be higher when the IP strategy is chosen than when it is not. Essen-
tially the same argument implies that, in certain important cases, aip > anip
actually holds. To see this we proceed in steps.
Fix k0 and a 2 (0;1) and consider rst the case in which the vector b is
high enough that IP is not optimal. Then the strategy NIP will be adopted
and a level of expenditure equal to anip will be maintained, independently
of the particular value of b. The innovator becomes indifferent between the
IP and the NIP strategy when
PNIP(anip;xa) anip = PIP(aip) aip b0:
We are interested in determining which, between anip and aip, is higher at
this point. The cost of increasing a is the same in both cases, so let us
compare the payoffs from decreasing l via a rise in a. The derivative of





















In particular, if 1=l, the expected length of time until the secret leaks out, is
smaller than the time at which k is reached, tk = log(k=k0)=g, then O0(l) >
0.
Next, compare the rest of the two equations term by term, holding l
constant at l(aNIP). The term within the rst square parenthesis is positive,
while the second is negative. Because M > xa, the term within the second
square parenthesis is always larger, in absolute value, in the IP equation.
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in the IP case. The former is always larger than the latter, since xa is chosen
to maximize this expression and there is no immediate result concerning
aip versus anip. Hence, and contrary to the initial presumption, allowing
for public rent-seeking does unambiguously reduce wasteful expenditure in
private rent-seeking.
We now complete the analysis by giving a class of examples where aip >
anip, or equivalently lnip < lip. The case relatively favorable to NIP is g
large; in this case xa approaches M and the NIP distortion is small. In
making g large, we at the same time consider k0 small, to keep the length of
time to the prot peak from changing as g gets larger. Specically, x k1.
Then it takes t = (1=g)log(k1=k0) to move from k0 to k1, hence t remains
constant if k0 is appropriately decreased as g is increased. We are especially
interested in the time1=lnip which is the mean length of time it takes for the
secret to leak out, and in the level of capital k for which µ(k) = 0. Notice
that as g ! ¥ we have k ! 0. If it takes 1=lnip to reach k then we see
that k0 = ke g=lnip, which we will adopt for purposes of constructing an
example. This implies that as g ! ¥ we also have O0(l) < O < 0. On the
















as g ! ¥. Consequently, there are parameter values g, lnip;b1;b0 such that
a small decrease in b0 causes privateexpenditure in secrecy to jump up from
anip to aip > anip.
We complete our discussion of private rent-seeking by considering the
dependence of a on a. Notice that a increases as a decreases, which makes
sense. Innovators that are operating in industries in which, when the secret
is lost, a large competitive fringe appears have a stronger incentive to invest
in keeping the secret. Also, in the case of public rent-seeking, the threshold
level k is lower when a is small. This also makes sense: when a is small
an innovator has a stronger incentive to grab the legal monopoly if he has
chosen the IP strategy to begin with.
5. WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
We have built our model to understand some of the welfare consequences
ofdifferentIP policies. Here weattack theproblemfromtwopointsof view.
First, we consider the traditional welfare or mechanism design approach inRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 25
which it is assumed that a benevolent government sets out to maximize
social welfare. We explore the consequences of this assumption for choices
concerning b. Then we turn to the case of more practical relevance, the case
in which government is either self-serving, or in which regulatory capture
takes place. We then ask the question of which choices of b maximize
government income.
5.1. Mechanism Design Perspective. We consider primarily the choice
between IP and no IP. The latter can be obtained by simply setting b high,
although because of the problems of rent-seeking government outlined in
the next subsection, a formal commitment, such as a constitutional prohi-
bition of patents of the sort used in Switzerland until the middle 1970s, is
likely to be more useful. We also comment, when IP is the optimal policy,
on the implications of the model for the choice of the two components of b.
There are several factors one needs to consider in comparing social wel-
fare between IP and no IP. Allowing IP leads most obviously to the dead-
weight loss of consumer surplus
(k0=M)r=g[U(M) u(M)]
weighted by the probability that the IP option is used. Second, there is
the social cost due to secrecy, that is, the loss wa due to large values of a.
Third, there is the fact that without IP, the innovator will produce less prior
to the loss of the secret, while it will produce more after it. Let us provide
an estimate for this loss. Specically, let Sxa be the ow social loss from
stopping at xa rather than growing to M as quickly as possible. The social








Finally, there is the loss wb from public rent-seeking. In the traditional
approach this latter cost, including the cost of enforcement, is ordinarily
ignored, and we will do so here, even if this cost may be large in practice.
The clearest case is the case discussed above in which g is large and k0
small. We showed in this case the IP leads to more secrecy than no IP.
In addition, we showed in this case that xa is close to M so that SMa is
negligible. If k < k0 so that the IP option is always used, the deadweight
lossofconsumersurplusremainssignicantwhenthereisIP.Inthiscasewe
can conclude that not IP is better than IP. A similar conclusion is reached
when l is very large, so the secret leaks away more or less immediately.
Specically, recall that  a = (k0=M)r=g(p(M) Ra(M)), and that i = l( a),
and suppose that i ! ¥. Here we cannot conclude that there is less secrecyRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 26








In this case there is not very much secrecy at all as the right hand side goes
to zero with i ! ¥, so the cost of private rent-seeking is negligible. As in
the case of g large, we conclude that wxa is small, yet making l larger does
not reduce the probability-weighted deadweight loss.
The case where k > k0 is less clearcut. In this case the deadweight loss
of consumer surplus will generally fall to zero as well, so the comparison
is now ambiguous. This, incidentally, provides a strong rationale against
setting b1 = 0. When b1 = 0 necessarily k < k0. Notice in passing that the
threshold level k is smaller when a is smaller. This means higher social
costs under IP: goods for which a is near zero are goods with the potential
of being easily copied and reproduced. Consequently, the social cost of
not reaching high consumption level is quite large. In this case public rent-
seeking has a higher social cost than otherwise.
Intellectual property is likely to be more useful when l is small. There
are two caveats to this. When l is small to start with, a low level of a,
with a correspondingly low level of wa, may be enough to lead it to be
zero, in which case the gain from allowing public rent-seeking disappears
if wb > 0. Further, the lower is l the higher is the consumer loss from
allowing for public monopoly, which further reduces the social gains from
setting b0 = 0.
The role of the parameter a in affecting the optimality of IP is also fairly
straightforward to outline. At the two opposite extremes, a = 0 and a = 1,
allowing for access to public rent-seeking does not appear socially useful,
In the rst case, even if private rent-seeking may be high when losing the
secret implies losing monopoly prots almost immediately, the consumer
loss from maintaining monopoly for ever via the IP option is particularly
high. In the second case, monopoly power is already high to start with
and maintained for a long time even after the secret leaks. In this case one
would expect low levels of a and, correspondingly, low levels of wa, with
small gains from introducing public IP. Further, at high values of a, the
target stock xa is likely to be closer to M, the target value under IP, and this
also reduces the social gains from allowing for public IP.
We have shown that p(M)  Ra(M)+b1 must hold for people to use IP.
Hence, should it be optimal to have people use IP instead of NIP, this in-
equality shows that the size of b should be chosen to depend on a. What
this implies is that a uniform patent policy across different sectors is not
desirable. The optimal patent policy varies from sector to sector, depending
on a, g, and l. If one moves away from the assumption of a benevolent andRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 27
fully informed planner, this observation underlies the intrinsic difculty of
designingan optimalIP policy. An effective patent policyrequires a consid-
erable amount of private information to be made available to the regulator,
and the latter to engage in an equally considerable amount of ne-tuning of
patent law, from sector to sector, and from market to market.
In summary, our analysis suggests that the most favorable case for IP
is when l is not particularly high and decreases slowly, g is low and a is
an intermediate value. Moreover, there is substantial benet from using b1
as a policy instrument rather than b0. By using b1 we can get k > k0 so
that the option will not always be used, and this mitigates the consumer
deadweight loss. Indeed, taking into account the consumer loss from low
output and slow growth in productive capacity, we would want to choose b1
large enough that no grabbing of the IP option occurs before xa is reached,
as the latter would be reached in any case even when IP is not allowed. A
fortiori, then, one is led to conclude that the optimal level of b1 is such that
k = M holds, if this is feasible given the other parameter values.
5.2. Endogenous Patent Cost. What if b is determined endogenously?
With this we mean that there is no benevolent planner trying to design the
socially optimal mechanism, but instead a prot maximizer setting the vec-
tor b in order to maximize own benets.
The main case to consider is, obviously, the one in which the planner is
maximizing personal pecuniary benets from setting b. That is, the case
in which the government is composed of self-seeking individuals acting in
their own private interest. In this case it is straightforward to notice that
the planner will set b at a level high enough to make the innovator almost
indifferent, in expected terms, between the IP and the NIP strategy. Notice
that, as we have shown above, the value of the dynamic component of the
IP option O(t) increases with time. In fact, for a given level of b1, that
option has zero value until a certain threshold is crossed, and it keeps in-
creasing until a productive capacity equal to M is reached. This behavior
of the public sector, though, leads us to the case considered at the end of
the previous section in which PNIP(anip;xa) anip = PIP(aip) b0  aip
and O0(aip)  0. Then we have that, unambiguously, aip > anip, so that
waip > wanip, and the availability of public rent-seeking makes everybody
worse off (with the exception of the government).
The intuition behind this result is clear: when the government sets fees
for legal enforcement of monopoly high enough to make the innovator
nearly indifferent between using and not using the b option, then an innova-
tor that is following the IP strategy has a stronger incentive to postpone the
Poisson event than an innovator that is following the NIP strategy. This isRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 28
because of two reasons. First, the innovator following the IP option is earn-
ing higher prots from being at or near M instead of xa, even if this may be
compensated by the fact that he gets to M somewhat later and with lower
probability. Second, the innovator is trying to accumulate enough capital so
that the threshold level k is crossed and the IP option O(t) takes on a pos-
itive value. We claim this situation is more relevant than one would like to
think, as the frequent cases of regulator capture, intense lobbying to allow
for extensions of IP protection, long and costly litigations between govern-
ment agencies and monopolies (ending with monopolies buying their way
out of court, as in the Microsoft case) all seem to conrm.
With optional patenting, as in this model, the innovator gets at least the
same return as without the patent system. But in practice the patent may be
awarded to someone else. Ponce [2003] points to some subtle issues that
arise under the existing practice component of patent law. Less subtle
issues arise when the application of the law is endogenous: unless the gov-
ernment can commit to giving the patent to the right party, there is a hold
up problem. A patent now acts like a business license - a rm cannot do
business without the patent, since if they do not get it someone else will.
In extreme cases all rent is extracted, the innovator earns nothing, and there
is no innovation. However, it may be that it is impossible to charge for the
license until after the secret leaks out. In this case monopoly prots can be
either smaller or bigger than competitive rent. So there may be less inno-
vation with IP than without it for this reason alone. Another possibility is
that the government does not have the capability of allocating narrow and
well specied patents to true innovators - it may, instead, randomly al-
locate the rights by issuing vague patents to general ideas; in this case the
patent holders can charge the innovator(s) that make use of the general idea
to which he claims a patent. This poses a big problem due to commitment,
since the government might be able to commit not to holdup the innovator
- but a bunch of scattered individuals clearly cannot credibly do the same,
nor they will. In practice we see a lot of this: submarine patents, patenting
things other people have done, and so forth.
In the absence of commitment, it is interesting to consider in more detail
the case in which the planner sets b1 after the secret is revealed in order to
maximize his own prot at that stage. In this case the lack of commitment
on the part of the planner may reduce his prots from the sale of patents
and lead to less private rent-seeking than otherwise.11 Notice that one of
the reasons for which an innovator may want to spend a larger amount on a
11Obviously, a complete analysis would also show that lack of commitment also leads
to much less innovation altogether, thereby making society much worse off. Hence, the
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when the IP strategy is chosen than when it is not, is to earn the opportunity
of making O(t) > 0, because the latter increases in value when capacity is
accumulated. If, on the other hand, the planner is unable to commit to a
certain level for b1, what the innovator should expect is the planner increas-
ing it as long as the secret is not revealed. If this is the case, then O(t) = 0
for all t and O0(a) = 0 as well. Hence, this crucial incentive to raise aip
above anip dissolves. In this case, even if g is particularly large, the private
return from increasing a is higher along the NIP than the IP strategy. These
circumstances may actually lead to the least damaging socially arrange-
ment, assuming the innovation rate is not affected by the planner inability
to commit. To see this notice that, in order to maximize earnings from b1,
the planner would set b0 = 0, thereby luring innovators into chasing the IP
strategy. In these particular circumstances the latter, as we have just argued,
implies lower private rent-seeking than the NIP one, thereby reducing the
social cost from secrecy.
Some nal observations are potentially interesting. When the innova-
tor has private information about how valuable and costly the innovation
is, circumstances will generally make things worse (from a social perspec-
tive) for allowing public protection of IP, since the optimal price to charge
will necessarily have some people self-selecting not to innovate. The polit-
ical economy of patents has perhaps to some extent escaped the attention
of those large multi-national (read U.S.) corporations lobbying most inten-
sively in favor of international patent protection through the WTO. The fact
is that local tribunals are most likely to award monopolies to locals. As for
international tribunals, perhaps it is wise to keep in mind the ice-skating
judges at the Olympic games.
6. CONCLUSION
We have built a model of innovation in which legal protection of intel-
lectual property may play a socially valuable role. This potentially useful
role follows from two assumptions: (i) that the sole innovator has access to
a costly private technology to keep secrecy and avoid competition from im-
itators, (ii) that monopoly rights may also be purchased via the public legal
system. One would hope that the availability of the public option leads to a
smallersocial costs of keeping the monopolypower by inducingthe innova-
tor to waste less resources in the private secrecy-keeping (and rent-seeking)
technology. By allowing for a trade-off between public and private rent-
seeking, we therefore entertain the possibility that the existence of patents
and similar legal devices may nd a welfare justication in the reduction
of wasteful private rent-seeking they bring about. The nal result is ratherRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 30
mixed. Even in this, purposefullyfavorable, setting, the case for patents and
legal IP protection turns out to endure analytical scrutiny poorly.
We show, in fact, that even when a benevolent central planner exists who
is able to fully commit to the socially optimal policy, legal IP protection
is desirable only under special parametric circumstances. While it is far
from obvious that such circumstances, as detailed in the previous section,
are empirically relevant, it should be kept in mind that, according to the
analysiscarried outhere, theoptimalpatentpolicyisonethattreatsdifferent
goods, different industries, and different markets differently. Therefore,
even leaving aside the realism of the parametric assumptions under which
patents are a socially useful tool, one remains with the need of justifying
the possession, on the part of the supposedly benevolent planner, of the
detailed information necessary to ne tune the cost of patents to the specic
requirements of each case. Mentioning the human fallibility of benevolent
planners brings to mind another of their most interesting properties: lack of
existence. Which leads to what we consider the main, or at least the most
surprising, result of this paper.
We showthat, whenthe cost of publicIP protectionis high, thenthe inno-
vator spends more when the IP option is available than when it is not. Next,
we show that selsh governments pursuing their self-interest will push the
cost of providing public IP protection exactly toward that level. In conclu-
sion, our analysis shows that the availability of patents leads to a lose-lose
proposition: when IP is set and managed by a self-interested government,
private expenditure in secrecy is at its highest, and the deadweight loss for
consumer due to monopoly power is also maximized.
There are many objections that can be raised to our analysis - for exam-
ple, capital market imperfections may lead to some unpriced spillovers. But
these types of frictions are not unique to investment in ideas and creations
- and while investment of all types may be reduced by capital market im-
perfections, it is not ordinarily suggested that the solution is a government
grantofmonopolypower. Ourresultshere pointtotheambiguityof theoret-
ical analysis of intellectual property. It is clear, as we argue in this context,
that allowing the government to grant monopolies is extremely dangerous
- and we should require clear and compelling evidence before doing so.
Since theoretical argument is insufcient to settle the point, since empiri-
cal evidence is almost non-existent, and since anecdotal evidence strongly
suggests that intellectual property reduces rather than encourages innova-
tion, there should be a strong presumption against patents and copyrights.
It is our view that they should be abolished pending strong and persuasive
evidence that they actually do some good.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 31
APPENDIX A. PROOFS
Recall that t(k) is the time it takes to reach k from k0 when the capital
stock grows at the rate g. A useful consequence of this denition, often used
in our calculations, is that e r(t(k) t(x)) = (x=k)r=g.
A.1. The function Ra(k).
Lemma A.1. The maximum net present value of prots starting with a pro-











Further, Ra(M)  p(M); and as g ! ¥, Ra(k) ! R0(k). The time spent at
M is s0 = (1=g)log(1=(1 a)).
Proof. Since it cannot be optimal to allow the capital stock to exceed M
before the Poisson event, we may assume k  M, where recall that M is the
level of productive capacity at which p(c) is maximized. After the Poisson
event, the capacity controlled by the competitive fringe is (1 a)k, always
growing at g. Innovator's capacity is ak. We argued in the text that the opti-
mal plan for the innovator is to allow his own capital to grow until industry
capacity reaches M, then decrease his own capital to keep industry capacity
at M until he runs out of capital. Starting at k, it takes s = (1=g)log(M=k)
units of time for industry capacity to reach M.
To calculate the length of the interim period during which the industry
remains at M, observe that s0 units of time after reaching M the competitive
fringe has increased its capital stock by
(1 a)M(egs0
 1):
When this is equal to aM the innovatorruns out of capital; this occurs when
s0 = (1=g)log(1=(1 a)).
We are now in position to compute the value for the innovator of a stock
of capital k when the event strikes, and a share (1 a) of productive capac-











p(M). Simplication yields the expression given in the conclusion, and the
limit as g ! ¥ follows directly from this expression.
￿
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Lemma A.2. Ra is single peaked. The (unique) maximizer Ma satises











Taking the rst derivative of R0(k) with respect to k we nd
R0
0(k) = (r=gk)[R0(k) p(k)]:




























Since Ra(M)  p(M) and p is single-peaked, Ra is also single-peaked.
Moreover, it is clear that the unique maximizer Ma satises Ra(Ma) =
p(Ma). Since increasing a strictly increases Ra it strictly increases R0
a(k)
and since Ra is single peaked, it follows that Ma is strictly increasing.




of growing as quickly as possible to a particular target capacity level x and
then staying there, it is convenient to dene the corresponding time path of
the capacity as
k(t;x) = minfk0egt;xg:
It is usefulalso to dene the prot from stickingto thistimepath of capacity





where, of course, PM(¥) = R1(k0).RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 33
Lemma A.3. The average present value prot when the IP option is not
used, the expenditure in private rent-seeking is a and the pre-event stopping
target is x is
PNIP(a;x) = Ra(k0)+(k0=x)(l+r)=g r
l+r
(p(x) Ra(x)):
Proof. Our rst step is to derive the expressions used in the main text to


















Consider rst t < t. Then
Px(t)+e rtRa(k(t;x)) = Ra(k0):
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Lemma A.4. The average present value prot (net of b) when the IP option
is used, and the expenditure in private rent-seeking is a is







Proof. Recall that in the text we dened the gain over Ra(k) from the plan
that involves paying b1 as
µ(k) =

R1(k) Ra(k) b1 k < M
p(M) Ra(M) b1 k  M :












and the expression for PIP(a) follows directly from Lemma A.3.
￿
A.3. Choice of xa. Finally, we characterize xafor the NIP, and the IP strat-
egy respectively. Dene m(x) = p(x) Ra(x).









Suppose in addition that the elasticity of m(x) is non-decreasing. Then the
solution of the rst order condition is unique. This solution xa is increasing
in g, decreasing in l, and r; it satises M > xa > Ma. Moreover, as g ! ¥,
xa ! M.
Proof. To compute xa from Lemma A.3 we differentiate
PNIP(a;x) = Ra(k0)+(k0=x)(l+r)=g r
l+r
(p(x) Ra(x))





















When the elasticity of m(x) is non-decreasing, it is apparent that this equa-
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to allow the capital stock to exceed M before the Poisson event, that is,
xa < M. By Lemma A.2 Ra(Ma)= p(Ma). This, together with the fact that
p0(Ma) > 0 and R0
a(Ma) = 0, implies xa > Ma.
Finally, we notice that xa is increasing in g and decreasing in l and r, as
intuition would suggest. The behavior of xa at large values of g is particu-
larly relevant for our analysis. From Lemma A.2 when g ! ¥, Ra(k) !






= 0 must hold. But R0
0(k)= (r=gk)[R0(k) p(k)],
impliesthat R0
0(k)=0 for all k when g!¥. Hence, the rst order condition
boils down to xap0(xa) = 0, which implies xa ! M for g ! ¥.
￿
APPENDIX B. OPTIMAL SECRECY
Here we discuss the optimal choices of anip and aip. Inspection of the func-
tions PNIP(a;x) and PIP(a) shows they are not concave with respect to a,
hence both rst and second order conditions need to be checked, and the
global maximum cannot be characterized directly.
























The left-hand side is positivebecause l0(a)< 0 and k0 < xa. It is not mono-
tone though, either increasing or decreasing, which allows for the presence
of more than one critical point. We are interested in critical points at which




















where A(a) is positive at all values of a. The function l(a) was assumed
decreasing and convex. Inspection of the right-hand-side of this expression
shows that, if it ever becomes negative, it will do so for values of a that are
relatively large. One can verify that this is certainly the case, for example,
with the simple functional form l(a) = l=a. Hence, when many criticalRENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 36
points exist, we should expect the maximizers to correspond to the highest
valued among them.
The rst order condition determining aip contains an additional factor be-
side those computed for the case of anip. This additional element is the










does not have a constant sign. It is uniformly zero whenever b is such
that µ(k0egt)  0. When µ(k0egt) > 0, O0(a) is positive at low values of
a (high values of l(a)) becoming negative as a increases (l decreases).
The intuition is the following: at low values of a, l is large and the density
l(a)e l(a)t places a high probabilityto the Poisson event taking place early,
that is, at low values of t. As we will soon show, the value of µ(k0egt)
increases with time. Hence, at low values of a the value of the option O(a)
is likely to be zero. As a increases and l(a) decreases this shifts part of the
distribution toward periods in which µ(k0egt) > 0, thereby increasing O(a).
In other words, an innovator who follows the IP strategy needs to buy time,
via a, to allow O(a) to increase its value, hence O0(a)> 0 initially. The rst








Considerations altogether analogous to those for the case of anip apply also
in relation to the uniqueness of the critical values for aip, and the negative
deniteness of ¶2PIP=¶a2.RENT-SEEKING AND INNOVATION 37
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